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INTRODUCTION 
Global financial crime affects millions of financial end-users,
1
 causes 
billions, if not trillions, of dollars in losses,
2
 and enables rogue leaders to 
plunder national wealth.
3
  Recent admissions, settlements and 
 
1. See Editorial, Libor’s Trillion-Dollar Question, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-27/libor-s-trillion-dollar-question.html 
(describing the Libor rate price fixing fraud and noting that the Libor rate affects nearly 
every kind of financing agreement from credit cards to auto finance to mortgages).   
 2.  Id. (“If, for example, underreporting caused Libor to be artificially depressed by 
0.1 percentage point for only a few months, payments on more than $300 trillion in 
mortgages, corporate bonds and derivatives tied to the benchmark might have fallen short by 
about $75 billion or so.  If the problem lasted a few years, the shortfall could be close to $1 
trillion”).  
 3.  See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, Tunisia Hires Ace To Track Down Ben Ali’s Assets, WALL 
ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/10/24/tunisia-hires-
ace-to-track-down-ben-alis-assets (noting that former Tunisian President and his family 
looted the nation and detailing efforts to recover the assets); How Did Egypt Become So 
Corrupt?, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 8, 2011, 15:12 GMT), 
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investigations have uncovered widespread global racketeering and fraud by 
large global corporations resembling organized crime more than banking.
4
  
The financial institutional activity includes: admissions of price fixing 
(Barclays),
5
 settlements of bid-rigging claims (J.P. Morgan),
6
 confessions 
of money laundering (HSBC),
7
 and settlement of money laundering charges 
(Standard Chartered).
8
 
 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2011/02/201128111236245847.html 
(describing rampant corruption in Egypt); Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the Twenty Sixth National Conference on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108.html (attributing the 
origination of the “Arab Spring” to a young Tunisian who was the victim of local 
corruption).   
 4.  See, e.g., Ellen Rosen, Municipal Bonds, UPS, JPMorgan, Student Loans: 
Compliance, BLOOMBERG (July 23,  2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-
23/municipal-bonds-ups-jpmorgan-student-loans-compliance.html (Discussing illegal 
activity at 13 major banks, including Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase & Co., and UBS 
AG );  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Regulator Says British Bank Helped Iran Hide Deals, 
N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/business/standard-chartered-bank-accused-of-hiding-
transactions-with-iranians.html?r=1&hp (“In June, the Justice Department and the New 
York County district attorney’s office reached a $619 million settlement with ING Bank 
over accusations that it had illegally moved billions of dollars into the United States for 
sanctioned Cuban and Iranian entities.”). 
 5.  Peter J. Henning, What the Barclays Settlement Means for Other Banks, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 3, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/whats-next-after-the-
barclays-settlement/ (“Barclays admitted to submitting false information at the behest of its 
traders to benefit pricing for derivatives, and later providing incorrect interest rates to 
counter media speculation about the bank’s stability.”). 
 6.  Eric Dash, JPMorgan Settles Bond Bid-Rigging Case for $211 Million, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/jpmorgan-settles-bond-bid-
rigging-case-for-211-million.html (“JPMorgan Chase reached a $211 million settlement 
with federal and state authorities on Thursday to resolve allegations that it cheated 
governments in 31 states by rigging the bidding process for reinvesting the proceeds of 
dozens of municipal bond transactions.”). 
 7.  Richard Blackden,  HSBC’s ‘money-laundering’ apology, THE TELEGRAPH, (July 
12, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9393874/HSBCs-
money-laundering-apology.html (“Stuart Gulliver, HSBC’s chief executive, told staff 
yesterday that ‘between 2004 and 2010, our anti-money laundering controls should have 
been stronger and more effective and we failed to spot and deal with unacceptable 
behaviour.’”). 
 8.  Ian Katz, U.S. Treasury Will Continue Standard Chartered Probe, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/u-s-treasury-will-continue-
standard-chartered-probe.html (“The U.S. Treasury Department said its investigation of 
Standard Chartered Plc will continue after the bank settled a New York money-laundering 
probe for $340 million.”).  See also Jessica Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4 (“Using its New 
York-based operations, a major British bank schemed with the Iranian government for 
nearly a decade to launder $250 billion, leaving the United States financial system 
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An intriguing question is whether the financial crime engaged in by 
financial institutions, such as fraud and money laundering, constitutes a 
violation of international law.  Treating such misconduct as violating 
international law would allow claims to be brought against financial 
institutions under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).
9
  The ATS allows non-
U.S. citizens to sue defendants
10
 in federal court for tortuous conduct 
 
vulnerable to terrorists and corrupt regimes, New York’s top banking regulator charged on 
Monday.”). 
 9.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”).  ATS litigation against financial institutions would be 
illustrative of the global trend of pursuing claims over “allegations of corporate misconduct 
overseas.”  Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends 
and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transitional Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 458 
(2011).  See also Peter Muchlinski, The Changing Face of Transnational Business 
Governance: Private Corporate Law Liability and Accountability of Transnational Groups 
in a Post-Financial Crisis World, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 665, 687-688 (2011) 
(discussing recent cases in Europe where corporations have been defendants in suits 
claiming that the corporations are liable for environmental damage, human rights abuses and 
war crimes). 
10.       There are two issues that impact whether a financial institution is subject to suit.  
First, the question of whether corporations may be liable for ATS claims is the subject of a 
circuit split.  Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that corporations may not be held liable under ATS), with Doe v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that corporations may be held liable under the 
ATS).  The issue of corporate liability was the basis for the Supreme Court accepting the 
Kiobel petition.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (U.S. 2011).  
However, the Court did not resolve the corporate liability issue, instead affirming the 
Second Circuit’s ruling based on the presumption against extraterritoriality.  Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  . The only reference to corporations was the 
Court’s statement in the context of whether the conduct sufficiently touches and concerns 
the U.S.—that “[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too 
far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. A reasonable 
inference from the sentence would be the Court is tacitly endorsing corporate liability.  
Moreover, notwithstanding the unsettled jurisprudence on corporate liability, the topic of 
this article remains relevant; even if a corporation is not liable under the ATS, the corporate 
officers and directors can be held liable for the underlying conduct.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2010) (“nothing in this opinion limits or 
forecloses suits under the ATS against the individual perpetrators of violations of customary 
international law— including the employees, managers, officers, and directors of a 
corporation — as well as anyone who purposefully aids and abets a violation of customary 
international law.”).  The second issue that bears on whether a financial institution is subject 
to suit is the Court’s ruling that the presumption against extraterritoriality is applicable to 
ATS claims.  However, the issue of corporate liability remains relevant because many of the 
potential defendants will be U.S. companies and, moreover, even foreign defendants may be 
unable to invoke the extraterritoriality argument depending on the extent their conduct 
touches and concerns the U.S.  See Joel Slawotsky, Corporate Liability for Violating 
International Law Under The Alien Tort Statute: The Corporation Through the Lens of 
Globalization and Privatization, INT’L. REV. L. (2013), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5339/irl.2013.6 notes 117-120 and accompanying text.  
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constituting a violation of international law.
11
  To be cognizable under the 
ATS, alleged conduct must violate the “law of nations.”  To qualify, the 
conduct must be universally condemned, specific, and touch upon the 
mutual interests of the nations.
12
  Torts that do not meet these requirements 
cannot form the basis of an ATS suit.
13
 
ATS claims are generally framed in the context of egregious 
violations of human rights such as torture,
14
 slavery,
15
 war crimes
16
 and 
crimes against humanity.
17
  Traditionally, courts have rejected fraud claims, 
limiting the ATS’s scope to suits seeking compensation for human rights 
abuse-linked personal injuries.
18
  However, to automatically reject financial 
crime as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction is incorrect for two reasons.  
One, any claim that international law is solely relegated to “human rights 
issues” is wrong.  Initially, international law was not concerned with 
human rights.  In fact, “the very notion of universal human rights was 
intellectually incompatible with the kind of systematic, large-scale 
exploitation routinely entailed by colonial rule.”
19
  Thus, there is no basis 
for excluding financial crimes as a cognizable conduct.  Two, international 
law was initially a reflection of commercially-based disputes, as opposed to 
being limited to the human rights context.
20
  Therefore, commercially-
based claims such as money laundering are closer to the original meaning 
of international law.  Accordingly, the issue deserves attention, and the 
 
  
 11.  See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 n.3 (“In this opinion we use the terms ‘law of nations’ 
and ‘customary international law’ interchangeably.”) (citing Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 
414 F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 12.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 13.  Joel Slawotsky, The New Global Financial Landscape: Why Egregious 
International Corporate Fraud Should Be Cognizable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 17 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 131, 150 (2006) (“Many torts have been rejected as predicate 
offenses permitted under the ATCA.”). Not all violations of international law are cognizable 
under the ATS; only misconduct that exhibits a particularly identifiable and strong 
transnational dimension, which is also sufficiently egregious, is actionable pursuant to the 
ATS.  See id. at 131–32 (2006) (explaining that only claims which implicate the “mutual 
concern of the nations of the world” are permitted under the statute). 
 14.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 15.  Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999).  
 16.  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 17.  Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 18.  See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that commercial 
theft is not cognizable). 
 19.  David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L .REV. 762, 834 (2012). 
 20.  See Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 185 (1996) 
(“An ostensibly ‘private business deal’ entered between a United States multinational and a 
developing country government dissolved into a domestic legal dispute, then percolated 
upward into a public international dispute.”). 
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routine rejection of financial crime as a cognizable claim is unjustified. 
Moreover, the ATS is a tort-based civil statute rather than a criminal 
one and contains no restrictive language with respect to the cognizable 
conduct.  ATS suits may be based upon violations of international law in 
other contexts, such as the failure to obtain informed medical consent.
21
  
Thus, presuming the defendants cannot invoke the presumption against 
extraterritoriality argument, the only relevant inquiry in determining ATS 
jurisdiction is whether the financial crime satisfies the requirements of 
being universally condemned, specific, and of mutual interest.
22
 
The question of whether global financial crime can serve as a basis for 
an ATS suit has garnered sparse academic attention.
23
  However, given 
global developments in finance, interwoven international markets, and the 
enormous power of financial and investment banking entities, the question 
of whether financial crime is actionable likely will need to be addressed by 
courts sooner rather than later.
24
  This article addresses the question and 
opines that compelling arguments exist in support of holding financial 
institutions liable for universally condemned, definable acts of financial 
crime
25
 that touch upon the mutual interests of nations.
26
 
 
 21.  See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding the failure to 
obtain informed medical consent violates international law). 
 22.  Financial crime may take various forms; there is no single definition.  See 
Sanctions Board Decisions, THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/58RC7DVWW0 
(last updated March 7, 2013)  (debarring based upon acts of forgery, fraud and bribery).  
 23.  A review of the literature reveals two previous articles:  Slawotsky, supra note 13; 
and Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational 
Corporations Are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 385 (2010).   
 24. These questions must be addressed because claims are proliferating.  For example, a 
Turkish company recently filed suit against a South African company for alleged fraud and 
bribery in Iran.  Tom Schoenberg & Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, MTN Promised Iran Money, 
UN Votes for Phone Deal: Rival, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-28/mtn-promised-money-weapons-un-votes-in-
iran-rival-says.html. 
 25.  I am not referring to garden-variety fraud or financial crimes.  The hurdle would be 
substantial and would be satisfied by the requirements of universality, specificity and 
mutual interest.   
26.      Neither the question of corporate liability nor the extraterritorial applicability of the 
ATS is addressed in this article. For a discussion of the corporate liability issue see Joel 
Slawotsky, Corporate Liability for Violating International Law Under The Alien Tort 
Statute: The Corporation Through the Lens of Globalization and Privatization, INT’L. REV. 
L. (2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.5339/irl.2013.6 notes 117-120 and 
accompanying text. 
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I. FINANCIAL CRIME: A VITAL GLOBAL ISSUE 
Financial crime is a proximate cause of national developmental 
failures.
27
  Striking at the foundation of international economic and political 
stability and the operation of law, financial crime is destructive, impedes 
democracy, and severely damages the global economy.
28
  “The accusations 
against Standard Chartered come as United States officials work to crack 
down on the flow of money to foreign countries, companies and individuals 
connected to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and drug 
trafficking.”
29
 
Financial crime’s effects vary but can be separated into three, 
sometimes overlapping, categories:  (a) a marker of failed states enabling 
rogue leaders and regimes to loot national assets and engage in violations 
of human rights; (b) imperiling democratic development, good governance 
and economic growth; and (c) escalating the risk of disastrous economic 
consequences due to inter-linked financial markets.  Each of these 
destructive consequences is examined below. 
A. A Marker of Failed States and Enabler of Rogue Regimes, Drug 
Cartels and International Terrorists 
Financial crime is endemic and far from being victimless.  Financial 
institutions are providing the financial support needed by enemies of 
mankind.  As detailed below, a litany of global evils is financed through 
financial institutions and, unsurprisingly, a substantial amount of money is 
at play. 
1. Rogue Regimes and Leaders 
A direct consequence of financial crimes is the support of rogue 
governments who have trampled upon their citizens’ rights.  Corporate-
 
 27.  See Fixing a Broken World, ECONOMIST (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/13035718 (“[T]here is evidence that economic growth in 
countries next to failing states can be badly damaged. And if a poorly functioning but 
important oil-producing state like Nigeria were to fall apart, the economic fallout would be 
global. Moreover, weak governments may lack the wherewithal to identify and contain a 
pandemic that could spread globally.”). 
 28.  Steven R. Salbu, Transnational Bribery: The Big Questions, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 435, 470 (2001) (noting that businesses, governments, NGOs, individuals and society 
are adversely affected by fraud and corruption); see also. Breuer, supra  note 3 (“At a 
concrete level, roads are not built, schools lie in ruin and basic public services go 
unprovided.  At a more abstract, but equally important, level, political institutions lose 
legitimacy, and people lose hope that they will ever be able to improve their lot.”). 
 29.  Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4.  
SLAWOTSKY_UPDATED WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/2013  12:58 PM 
964 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
enabled financial crime facilitates money laundering,
30
 the destabilization 
of nations,
31
 and looting of national treasures.
32
  Such misconduct is linked 
to human rights abuses and the strengthening of political and military 
dictatorships.
33
 
For example, Iran has imprisoned and tortured political opponents and 
brutally crushed a popular uprising.
34
  Another exemplar is the current 
leader of Syria, President Assad, who has engaged in a civil war with 
Syrian citizens producing an estimated death count in the thousands.
35
  
Other examples abound: North Korea imprisons perhaps 200,000 
“criminals” and “opponents” in re-education camps where torture and 
starvation are the means of re-education,
36
 and the former leaders of Egypt, 
Libya and Tunisia were well known for trampling upon the rights of their 
citizens.
37
 
 
 30.  See Evan Perez, HSBC Nears Pact in Launder Probe, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303612804577529160960052778.html  
(discussing a Justice Department prosecution of HSBC bank officials’ involvement in 
money laundering). 
 31.  Stewart M. Patrick, How Transnational Crime Hinders Development-and What To 
Do About It, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BLOG (June 26, 2012), 
http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2012/06/26/how-transnational-crime-hinders-development-and-
what-to-do-about-it/ (“At the macroeconomic level, as the IMF emphasizes, crime and 
money laundering undermine the stability of financial institutions, increase the volatility of 
capital flows, and dampen foreign direct investment.  Crime drains resources from more 
productive economic activities, and can even destabilize neighboring countries, as the 
spillover of weapons, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and violent gangs across Central 
America attests.”). 
 32.  Paul Richter, As Libya Takes Stock, Moammar Kadafi’s Hidden Riches Astound, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/21/world/la-fg-kadafi-money-20111022 (discussing the 
Kadafi regime’s plundering of national wealth). 
 33.  See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4, at A3 (Discussing accusations that banks 
“facilitate[e] illegal flows of money” from outside the United States to banks with terrorist 
ties or to “Iranians who wanted to circumvent United States sanctions.”) ; see also Evan 
Perez & Devlin Barrett, Senate Probe Faults HSBC, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 16, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304388004577531330703359436.html#art
icleTabs%3Dcomments (“The report also said that key data were stripped from transactions 
with Iran, North Korea and Sudan to evade U.S. sanctions and U.S. regulations. HSBC 
executives sought to stop doing business with a Saudi private bank over terrorism-financing 
concerns, according to Senate investigators, but then reversed themselves.”).  
 34.  UN: Expose Iran’s Appalling Rights Record, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 21, 
2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/21/un-expose-iran-s-appalling-rights-record. 
 35.  Ashley Fantz, Syria Death Toll Probably at 70,000, U.N. Human Rights Official 
Says, CNN (Feb. 12, 2013, 9:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/12/world/meast/syria-
death-toll. 
 36.  North Korea: Catastrophic human rights record overshadows’Day of the Sun,’ 
AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/north-korea-catastrophic-
human-rights-record-overshadows-day-sun-2012-04-12. 
 37.  Shadi Mokhtari, The Middle East and Human Rights: Inroads Towards Charting 
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Another effect of financial crime is the looting of national wealth.  
Nations with large sums of national wealth are often plagued by chronic 
poverty and human rights violations.
38
  This impoverishment is symbolized 
and perhaps in part caused by the immense transfer of national wealth 
abroad.  The removal of large sums from the national treasury requires the 
sophisticated services of financial institutions.  Without this outside help, 
the national rulers would not be able to rob their national treasuries.  
Patrick Keenan notes this phenomenon: “the widespread emergence of 
[Libyan sovereign wealth funds] creates a risk that such rulers will further 
insulate themselves from political accountability by moving even more of 
the state's resources outside the typical channels of domestic political 
control.”
39
  
In Libya, for example, former leader Col. Kadafi diverted an 
astounding sum of $200 billion into bank accounts, real estate, stock 
investments and businesses abroad.
40
  The investments were held in the 
name of the Libyan sovereign wealth fund (“SWF”) and other national 
institutions but as the rogue leader, Kadafi and his family considered and 
treated those assets as their own personal wealth.
41
  Financial crime 
undertaken by financial institutions aided and abetted this heist.  The 
Libyan SWF is being investigated and attempts are being made to track 
down the plundered assets.
42
  The asset transfer, investments and bank 
accounts were all accomplished by financial institutions who garnered large 
profits.  It is difficult to believe these financial institutions and their 
compliance departments were unaware of the business and political 
relationship between Kadafi and the Libyan SWF. 
Former Egyptian political leaders, family members and business 
 
its Own Path, 10 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 194 (2012). 
 38.  ARVIND GANESAN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOME TRANSPARENCY, NO 
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE USE OF OIL REVENUE IN ANGOLA AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
16-17, (2004) (“Furthermore, the opaqueness of the government’s activity impedes 
Angola’s emerging civil society from exercising government oversight, educating the 
public, or critiquing government decision making, all of which are crucial for increased 
respect for human rights.”).  
 39.  Patrick J. Keenan, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Social Arrears: Should Debts to 
Citizens be Treated Differently than Debts to Other Creditors?, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 434 
(2008).  
 40.  Richter, supra note 31 (“Moammar Kadafi secretly salted away more than $200 
billion in bank accounts, real estate and corporate investments around the world before he 
was killed . . . .”). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Joe Palazzolo, Libya Rebels Investigate Corruption at Sovereign Wealth Fund, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2013), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/08/25/libya-rebels-investigate-corruption-at-
sovereign-fund/ (“The National Transitional Council has appointed a former technocrat with 
the Gadhafi regime to track down Libya’s foreign assets . . . .”). 
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associates are being investigated by the new Egyptian government for a 
litany of financial crimes and asset transfers out of the country.
43
  
According to the World Bank, the Egyptian prosecutor’s office  
has opened an investigation into thousands of reports against 
officials in the former regime for obtaining financial gain from 
corruption for themselves or others . . . .  Because of the complex 
ties those persons had and the great power they wielded by virtue 
of their former prominent public functions, they were able to 
transfer vast sums of money gained from crimes of corruption out 
of the country, which impeded its development.
44
   
In Tunisia, there is an attempt to repatriate national assets allegedly 
plundered by the previous ruler.  A substantial amount of wealth was 
purportedly moved offshore to safe havens.
45
  The amount is so vast that 
the $30 million in private jets recovered is considered a minor percentage.
46
 
2. Narcotics 
International drug trafficking is enabled by access to financial 
institutions that reap enormous profits doing business with these illegal 
businesses.  U.S. federal and state governments have launched 
investigations for potential violations of money laundering laws that may 
 
 43.  Liam Stack, Mubarak’s Sons Charged With Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 
2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/world/middleeast/mubaraks-sons-charged-with-
insider-trading.html (“State television reported that the Mubarak brothers and seven other 
men, including the co-chief executives of Egypt’s most prominent investment bank, were 
charged with obtaining over $400 million through corrupt practices in relation to the 2007 
sale of Al Watany Bank. Gamal and Alaa have been in prison since last spring.”); Spain: 
Court Orders Mubarak Associate to Face Corruption Charges in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/world/europe/spain-court-orders-mubarak-
associate-to-face-corruption-charges-in-egypt.html (“Mr. Salem, a former Egyptian army 
and intelligence officer, was being held on suspicion of money laundering and corruption.”).  
 44.  STAR: STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE, Hosni Mubarak (various 
jurisdictions), http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18509 (last visited May 4, 
2013). 
 45.  Mark V. Vlasic, Getting Back the Bad Guy’s Loot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/opinion/getting-back-the-bad-guys-loot.html (“One 
year ago, the eyes of the world focused on Tunisia as its ruler, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, fled 
the country, allegedly with millions of dollars in gold and assets on his airplane.  The 
government of Tunisia is now working with the international community to recover Ben 
Ali’s ill-gotten gains.”). 
 46.  Id. (“Of course, the estimated $30 million that these jets were worth is but a drop in 
the bucket when compared with the assets that the Ben Ali clan is alleged to have plundered. 
But asset recovery is not just about the money; it is also about the demonstration effect.”). 
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have financed narcotics traffickers and terrorist organizations.
47
  In one 
example, nearly $400 billion of illegal drug generated profits were 
laundered through the banking system.
48
  According to a U.S. federal 
prosecutor, “Wachovia’s blatant disregard for our banking laws gave 
international cocaine cartels a virtual carte blanche to finance their 
operations.”
49
 
Per the former United Nations Drug Czar, international criminal gangs 
were not merely laundering money but were influencing the banking 
system as such funds were a huge source of cash during a liquidity crisis. 
According to Antonio Mario Costa, “[s]ome of the evidence put before his 
office indicated that gang money was used to save some banks from 
collapse when lending seized up” raising troubling questions about crime's 
influence on the economic system at times of crisis.
50
 
3. Terrorism 
Terrorism is a business and terrorist groups may in fact be organized 
as corporate affiliates.  The business of terrorism requires access to 
financial markets for money laundering purposes, wiring abilities and funds 
available for investments require money management skills.  All of these 
services are fee generators. 
Money is the lifeblood of terrorist and narcotics organizations, and 
while banks that launder money for terrorists and narco-traffickers may be 
located abroad, recent announcement demonstrates that those banks and 
their assets are not beyond our reach.
51
 
 
 47.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, Money-Laundering Inquiry Is Said to Aim 
at U.S. Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/business/money-laundering-inquiry-said-to-target-us-
banks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&src=recg (“Federal and state authorities are investigating 
a handful of major American banks for failing to monitor cash transactions in and out of 
their branches, a lapse that may have enabled drug dealers and terrorists to launder tainted 
money . . . .”). 
 48.  Ed Vulliamy, How A Big US Bank Laundered Billions from Mexico’s Murderous 
Drug Gangs, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/03/us-bank-mexico-drug-gangs (“[T]he bank 
was sanctioned for failing to apply the proper anti-laundering strictures to the transfer of 
$378.4bn – a sum equivalent to one-third of Mexico’s gross national product – into dollar 
accounts from so-called casas de cambio (CDCs) in Mexico, currency exchange houses 
with which the bank did business.”). 
 49.   Id. 
 50.  Rajeev Syal, Drug Money Saved Banks in Global Crisis, Claims UN Advisor, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/2009/dec/13/drug-money-
banks-saved-un-cfief-claims.   
 51.  Christie Smythe & Patricia Hurtado, Feds Grab $150 Million Tied to Hezbollah 
Money-Laundering, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
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Money laundering facilitates terrorism because monetary backing is 
the key to terrorist activity.  “Money laundering is the process of disguising 
criminal proceeds and may include the movement of clean money through 
the United States with the intent to commit a crime in the future (e.g., 
terrorism).”
52
  Banks are central to money laundering.
53
  Both federal and 
state government agencies are investigating several large American 
financial institutions “for failing to monitor cash transactions in and out of 
their branches, a lapse that may have enabled drug dealers and terrorists to 
launder tainted money . . . .”
54
 
As avenues of revenue, terrorist groups may be highly desirable and 
lucrative clients of financial institutions since these groups deal in large 
sums of cash that needs to be laundered.
55
 
B. National Developmental Failures: Damage to Democracy, Good 
Governance, and Economic Growth 
The principles of human rights are often cast aside in nations with 
rampant fraud and corruption,
56
 adversely affecting the rule of law, 
government, and society.  In countries with high levels of corruption, the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts is impeded, and military intervention and 
the use of force against civilians becomes more common.
57
  Numerous 
studies have established the “devastating effects of corruption on 
economics, political stability, and human rights . . . .”
58
States plagued with 
 
08-20/feds-grab-150-million-tied-to-hezbollah-money-laundering.html (quoting Manhattan 
U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara). 
 52.   I.R.C. § 9.5.5.1 (Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-
005-005.html.  
 53.   See, e.g., Money Laundering at Lebanese Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/12/13/world/middleeast/lebanese-money-
laundering.html (“According to American officials, the Lebanese Canadian Bank was the 
hub of an international drug money laundering operation with ties to Hezbollah. Used car 
and other consumer goods sales revenues had been used to mask the proceeds of illegal drug 
trade.”). 
 54.   Silver-Greenberg & Protess, supra note 47. 
 55.  See Smythe & Hurtado, supra note 51 (The U.S. Attorney’s office in Manhattan 
stated that “[t]he U.S. seized $150 million in connection with a Hezbollah-related money 
laundering scheme that involved the defunct Lebanese Canadian Bank . . . .”).   
 56.  See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change or the Illusion of Change: The War Against 
Official Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 697, 743 (2006) (finding a 
positive correlation between corruption and human rights violations). 
 57.  See Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of the Corporation in 
Fostering Sustainable Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 394-98 (2002) (noting a 
negative correlation between levels of corruption and peaceful resolution of disputes).  
 58.  Benjamin B. Wagner & Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Retooling Law Enforcement to 
Investigate and Prosecute Entrenched Corruption: Key Criminal Procedure Reforms for 
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financial crime do not properly serve their citizens, and the cost to the 
world economy is staggering.
59
 
Sometimes the amount of money stolen and transferred to elites and 
“connected” individuals is almost incomprehensible.  In Africa, it is 
estimated that over $100 billion is annually lost to theft, fraud and 
corruption.
60
  Businesses also bear direct and indirect costs when operating 
in corrupt nations.
61
  Financial crime “directly affects the lives and well-
being of billions of people and thousands of organizations.”
62
  Bad 
governments make poor decisions vis-à-vis their citizenry—the people the 
government should be serving—and the economy suffers.  The economic 
toll results in: 
(1) reduction in productive investment and growth; (2) macro-
fiscal costs, in particular the "loss of massive amounts of public 
revenues from taxes, customs duties, and privatization 
programs"; (3) redistributional/social costs; (4) economic 
inefficiency, particularly through the protection of affined firms 
and the discouragement of entrepreneurs and competitor firms; 
and (5) distortion or loss of foreign aid and debt relief 
programs.
63
 
Fraud and corruption can result in badly designed and poorly implemented 
infrastructure, inferior goods and services, and dysfunctional financial aid 
programs.
64
  Corruption can proximately cause or worsen mass scale 
poverty and starvation.  In India, “350 million families liv[e] below India’s 
poverty line of 50 cents a day.”
65
  While financial aid to lessen the poverty 
exists, this money can be siphoned off: 
[A]s much as $14.5 billion in food was looted by corrupt 
politicians and their criminal syndicates over the past decade in 
Kishen’s home state of Uttar Pradesh alone, according to data 
 
Indonesia and Other Nations, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 183, 191 (2008). 
 59.  Philip Nichols, The Psychic Costs of Violating Corruption Laws, 45 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 145, 161 (2012) (noting loss of tax revenue, lower economic growth, 
reduction in investment and general economic inefficiency).  
 60.  Arnold Beichman, Corruption in Africa, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2006), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/4/20061104-103213-2259r/.  
 61.  These relate to the paying of bribes as well as doing business in a slow moving 
bureaucratic environment with poor infrastructure.  David Hess, Combating Corruption 
Through Corporate Transparency, 21 MINN. J. INT’L. L. 42, 47 n.23 (2011). 
 62.  Nichols, supra note 59, at 155. 
 63.  Id. at 161. 
 64.  Id. at 159-160. 
 65.  Mehul Srivastava & Andrew MacAskill, Poor in India Starve as Politicians Steal 
$14.5 Billion of Food, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-28/poor-in-india-starve-as-politicians-steal-14-5-
billion-of-food.html. 
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compiled by Bloomberg.  The theft blunted the country’s only 
weapon against widespread starvation — a five-decade-old 
public distribution system that has failed to deliver record 
harvests to the plates of India’s hungriest.
66
 
Moreover, governments and elites in resource-rich nations may enjoy 
immense wealth while the general public remains in dire need of foreign 
financial aid.  These nations are corruptly managed for the benefit of select 
elites who allow their national infrastructure to decay; health and education 
systems to remain chronically outdated; and their citizens’ standard of 
living to languish.
67
 
Ironically, many of these nations receive international welfare despite 
being “rich” (as proven by their SWFs):
68
 
To illustrate the problem, consider that some states with large 
SWFs are also the recipients of development assistance from 
other states.  For example, in 2006, Algeria received just over 
$208 million in development assistance from foreign 
governments. During the same period, the government of Algeria 
controlled an SWF worth $47 billion.  In 2006, Libya also 
received $37 million in development assistance while controlling 
an SWF worth $50 billion, and Nigeria received $11 billion in 
development assistance and controlled an SWF worth $17 
billion.
69
 
The wealth of some nations is concentrated while their political leaders 
bear no accountability: 
For example, in Angola, a small coterie of elites receives and has 
almost complete control over that country's vast oil wealth.  The 
second condition depends in part on the first: those who control 
the wealth are not politically accountable to an engaged, 
informed electorate.  In some states, the lack of political 
accountability is both a cause and an effect of unconditioned 
wealth.  In states where the only way to accumulate wealth is 
through politics, unconditioned wealth can provide politicians 
with the resources they need to hold onto power against their 
challengers.  Third, unconditioned wealth is not subject to the 
discipline that the financial markets impose on other forms of 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  See Keenan, supra note 39 at 439-40 (“States whose citizens need development and 
humanitarian assistance even while their leaders invest abroad via SWFs highlights the gulf 
that often lies between those in power and citizens in poor states.”). 
 68.   See id. at 440 (“A number of states both receive official development assistance 
and, at the same time, possess millions or billions of dollars in their SWFs.”). 
 69.  Id. at 435. 
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wealth.
70
   
Endemic fraud results in poor governmental decisions wherein the 
citizens are impoverished and lack basic infrastructure, educational 
opportunity, and personal security, among other unmet needs.
71
  Fraud and 
corruption reduce the available number of skilled government workers, 
discourage tax compliance, cause government expenditures to be inflated, 
and result in wholly undemocratic ways of governance and doing 
business.
72
 
C. The Risk of Severe Economic Loss Due To Contagion 
Global economic growth depends upon predictability and fairness, and 
the proliferation of interconnected financial markets is a hallmark of an 
increasingly global society. The interconnected nature of global markets is 
indisputable.
73
  Economies are also adversely affected by financial crime.
74
   
Thus, contagion poses the real and significant risk that financial fraud 
could have disastrous international effects.
75
 
Indeed, the LIBOR scandal where major banks allegedly acted 
fraudulently to enlarge their lending profits exemplifies how global 
financial institutions’ misconduct can have repercussions world-wide.
76 
U.S. Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General Breuer noted:   
LIBOR and EURIBOR are critically important benchmark 
interest rates . . . . Because mortgages, student loans, financial 
derivatives, and other financial products rely on LIBOR and 
EURIBOR as reference rates, the manipulation of submissions 
used to calculate those rates can have significant negative effects 
 
 70.  Id. at 439. 
 71.  Nichols, supra note 59, at 150-55 (providing examples of endemically corrupt 
nations). 
 72.  Id. at 156-157. 
 73.  See Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying The Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. 
Courts, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887 (2012) (discussing the  interconnected nature of the 
global economy as highlighted by the international effect of the U.S. subprime market 
meltdown). 
 74.  Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681 (1995). 
 75.  See Prasanna Gai & Sujit Kapadia, Contagion in Financial Networks (Bank of 
England Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 383, 2010), available 
at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/workingpapers/wp383.pdf (co
mmenting on the risk to international markets because of contagion).   
 76.  See Christopher Alessi, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/uk/understanding-libor-scandal/p28729#p5 
(noting various effects of the LIBOR scandal such as reduced ability of banks to retain 
deposits due to lack of trust, potential legal liability and losses to consumers of credit on 
LIBOR based interest rates). 
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on consumers and financial markets worldwide.
77
   
This is not surprising as LIBOR is an example how global markets are 
interconnected.  “Futures, options, swaps, and other derivative financial 
instruments traded in the over-the-counter market and on exchanges 
worldwide are settled based on LIBOR.”
78
 
The interrelated relationship between debt and equity markets is 
entrenched.
79
  Coupled in particular with the numerous financial institutions 
and investment banks conducting business across the globe, the risk that 
misconduct can lead to great loss is high.  However, contagion dwarfs the 
mere globalization of business and investments.  Debt contagion arises 
from the overlapping investments in each nation’s debt.  If one nation 
defaults, that default may cause other nations to default as the latters’ 
ability to repay their debts is eviscerated.  For example, the 2011 EU debt 
crisis “strained banking institutions in Europe and around the world that 
hold large amounts of government and private debt.  With Italy teetering, 
France’s banks, which are among the largest holders of Italian debt, are 
now under pressure.”
80
 
Banks are at great risk as these entities own large amounts of debt and 
profit from the yield disparity between what they pay to obtain capital and 
the interest earned on investments. 
“Europe’s banking sector has the potential to collapse if contagion 
gets out of hand . . . .”
81
  Since the markets are interwoven, the risk that 
defaults and collapses will spread is relatively high. 
The interconnectedness of Europe’s financial system illustrates the 
risks of contagion.  Fear over Greece, along with an ailing banking sector 
in Spain, pushed up Spanish and Italian bond yields, hurting banks that 
hold these assets.  
 
 77.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct 
Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank 
Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html.  
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING 
SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS (2008), available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf (the “crisis that originated 
in a small segment of the U.S. mortgage markets has spread to broader cross-border credit 
and funding markets . . . .”). 
 80.  The Danger of Contagion from Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/11/10/world/europe/the-risk-to-banks-of-europes-
debt-problems.html. 
 81.  Agustino Fontevecchia, Dangers of Contagion: EU Banks Sitting on a Lot of 
European Bonds, FORBES (May 29, 2012),  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/05/29/dangers-of-contagion-eu-banks-
sitting-on-a-lot-of-european-bonds/. 
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Jumping across the Atlantic, major U.S. banks hold big positions 
overseas as well.  Citigroup leads the way when it comes to net exposure to 
non-U.S. sovereign governments, with a little more than €14 billion ($17.5 
billion) on their balance sheet.  JPMorgan Chase comes in second, with 
about €8 billion ($10 billion), while Morgan Stanley completes the podium 
with €5 billion ($6.2 billion); Goldman Sachs holds about €4 billion ($5 
billion) in non-U.S. sovereigns.
82
 
Derivatives pose a serious multiplication of risk.  Derivatives are 
financial bets that a market or some other variable will move in a certain 
way and large profits or losses can result.
83
  JPMorgan Chase is estimated 
to have lost as much as $5-$10 billion
84
 in a derivative bet.  To date, the 
actual loss is unknown. 
The collapse of MF Global and the resultant losses are illustrative of 
the danger from derivatives.  MF Global engaged in derivate betting and 
lost a substantial amount of money, causing its bankruptcy.
85
  The firm 
placed a “$6.3 billion bet on European debt — a wager big enough to wipe 
out the firm five times over if it went bad.”
86
  The firm lost its bet and the 
financial losses were harsh: 
The consequences of the firm’s collapse have been severe: Some 
$1 billion in customer money remains missing and thousands of 
clients, including both small farmers in Kansas and hedge funds 
in Connecticut, still do not have nearly a third of their funds. 
Some of that money may never be recovered if, as some 
regulators now fear, MF Global used it to cover trading losses 
and replenish overdrawn bank accounts.
87
 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See Michael Mackenzie, Nicole Bullock & Telis Demos, JPMorgan Loss Exposes 
Derivative Dangers, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 15, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d0ca4bae-9dda-11e1-9456-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz250kZFUax (explaining that derivatives magnify exponentially the 
risk in financial markets).   
 84. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, JPMorgan Trading Loss May 
Reach $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012) 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/jpmorgan-trading-loss-may-reach-9-billion/ 
(“Losses on JPMorgan Chase’s bungled trade could total as much as $9 billion, far 
exceeding earlier public estimates, according to people who have been briefed on the 
situation.”); Peter Eavis, JPMorgan’s Mystery Number in Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/jpmorgans-mystery-number-in-derivatives/  
(“In July, the bank said that losses on its botched trades had reached $5.8 billion and could 
grow.”). 
 85. See Azam Ahmed, Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, A Romance with Risk that 
Brought On a Panic, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2011),  
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/a-romance-with-risk-that-brought-on-a-panic/. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
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The amount of notional derivate positions is staggering - hundreds of 
trillions of dollars.
88
  While a substantial majority of these positions are 
hedged, there remains a significant amount of net open positions, which of 
course may result in spectacular profits or stunning losses.
89
  Moreover, 
because of the interconnected nature of our financial markets, the potential 
of contagion is real, which could lead to a synchronized collapse.
90
  This 
hazard, known as “systemic risk”, is embedded in the financial system due 
to the derivate bets.  According to the Deutsche Bundesbank: 
As the global financial crisis unfolded, one particularly 
noteworthy feature was the strong comovement of financial 
institutions’ credit spreads.  The magnitude and speed of these 
comovements caught many observers off guard and highlighted 
the fact that contagion can be an important amplifier of systemic 
risk.  Moreover, comovements were not limited to national 
financial systems but quickly spread across borders, affecting 
single institutions and entire financial systems.  The global 
financial crisis thus signaled the need to develop a framework for 
the surveillance of systemic risks.
91
 
Therefore, fraudulent conduct is not merely the concern of a nation or 
particular region.  Fraudulent conduct contains the real risk that fraud may 
result in widespread loss.  Furthermore, because of derivatives, and the 
ensuing multiplication of potential loss, the danger of systemic risk is 
 
 88.   See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT 
ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES SECOND QUARTER 2011 (2011), available 
at http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/trading/derivatives/dq211.pdf (noting that “[t]he notional amount of derivatives 
held by insured U.S. commercial banks increased $5.3 trillon, or 2.2%, from the first quarter 
of 2011 to $249 trillion.  Notional derivatives are 11.6% higher than a year ago.”).  
 89.  According to the Bank of International Settlements, the reason AIG almost failed in 
2009 was a large unhedged position.  See Stephen G. Cecchetti, Jacob Gyntelberg & Marc 
Hollanders, BIS Quarterly Review: Central Counterparties for Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS 45 (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0909f.pdf (“AIG’s unhedged sales of nearly half a 
trillion dollars of insurance represented a significant concentration of credit risk in a market 
participant that ultimately did not have the necessary loss absorption capacity. The 
widespread bond defaults during the recent crisis imposed substantial losses on AIG and 
other sellers of credit risk insurance.”). 
 90.  See Natalia Pdlich & Michael Wedow, Credit Contagion Between Financial 
Systems (Deutsche Bundesbank Eurosystem Discussion Papers Series 2: Banking and 
Financial Studies, No. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Discussion_Paper_2/201
1/2011_12_30_dkp_15.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (“The crisis has demonstrated that 
systemic events can rapidly spill over across borders and to markets, gathering strength and 
augmenting systemic risk. The vulnerability of financial institutions to contagious effects 
has placed this issue on top of the agenda of financial stability regulation.”).  
 91.  Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  
SLAWOTSKY_UPDATED WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/2013  12:58 PM 
2013] FINANCIAL CRIME UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 975 
 
substantial. 
II. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN FINANCIAL CRIME 
The endemic role of financial institutions in facilitating the financial 
interests of rogue nations and leaders is indisputable.  Without such 
financial services, these regimes and leaders would not be in a position to 
allow mass incarceration, starvation, murder of political opponents or 
engage in acts designed to crush opposition.  Revelations that large banking 
houses have done business with rogue regimes are not surprising.
92
  Large 
profits can be made by working with, managing the assets of, and 
providing financial services to rogue regimes.
93
  Fees and commissions can 
serve as a lucrative temptation to large financial institutions to do business 
with oil-rich failed states, well-financed terrorists, and cash-rich drug 
cartels.
94
 
The potential profits serve as a keen incentive for global banking 
powerhouses to conduct business with rogue nations: 
Since 2009, the Justice Department, the Treasury Department and 
the Manhattan district attorney’s office, working largely in 
concert, have brought charges against five foreign banks, 
contending they moved billions of dollars through their American 
subsidiaries on behalf of Iran, Cuba and North Korea, sponsors of 
terrorism and drug cartels.
95
 
The specter of earning significant profits is powerful and can serve as 
incentive for financial institutions to violate the law.  “In 2007, Deutsche 
 
 92.  See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Deutsche Bank’s Business with Sanctioned Nations 
Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2012, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/18/business/deutsche-banks-business-with-sanctioned-
nations-under-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all (“Federal and state prosecutors are 
investigating Deutsche Bank and several other global banks over accusations that they 
funneled billions of dollars through their American branches for Iran, Sudan and other 
sanctioned nations, according to law enforcement officials with knowledge of the cases.”). 
 93.  See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4, at A1 (“The New York State Department of 
Financial Services accused Standard Chartered, which the agency called a ‘rogue 
institution,’ of masking more than 60,000 transactions for Iranian banks and corporations, 
motivated by the millions of dollars it reaped in fees.”). 
 94.  MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT OF COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS PERMANENT S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, KEEPING FOREIGN 
CORRUPTION OUT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUR CASE HISTORIES (2010), available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/psi-staff-report-keeping-foreign-corruption-out-of-
the-us (showing four examples of financial crimes containing hundreds of individual 
transactions, many in the amounts of tens of millions of dollars, which surely generate hefty 
account fees.). 
 95.  Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4. 
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Bank decided to ‘not engage in new business with counterparties such as 
Iran, Syria, and North Korea  . . .  according to a 2008 securities filing.”
96
  
However, such business associations are both profitable and enduring: 
At least several European banks that vowed to stop doing 
business with Iran have kept handling billions of euros in 
transactions for Iranian entities and foreign companies with 
operations there, a review of regulatory filings and other 
documents by The Wall Street Journal shows. . . . 
Exact figures on the volume of transactions aren't publicly 
known, but the Journal's review shows that European banks have 
billions of euros in long-term trade-finance contracts in Iran.  The 
dealings are a sign of Iran's continued access to the global 
financial system despite U.S. efforts to isolate Iran, and go 
against a perception among some observers that the banks have 
cut ties to Iran completely.
97
 
Even modestly wealthy clients can generate large fees.
98
  Deep-
pocketed and resource-rich nations provide a source of lucrative and highly 
profitable clients, whose crooked leaders often amassed their fortunes by 
plundering their citizenry.
99
  The wealth is staggering and the fee 
generation possibilities tantalizing: 
In Kenya, $4 billion disappeared during the presidency of Daniel 
Arap Moi’s 24 years in power. . . .  The country’s Central Bank 
was looted, money was stolen by making fictitious payments on 
foreign debt, kickbacks were collected on all public contracts and 
when that didn’t supply enough cash, politicians awarded 
themselves phony contracts.
100
 
According to Transparency International’s former director Jerome 
Pope: 
 
 96.  David Crawford & Laura Stevens, European Lenders Keep Ties to Iran, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443696604577644781261934626.html?mo
d=WSJEurope_hpp_LEFTTopStories.  
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See, e.g., Terence O’Hara & Carrie Johnson, Tax Shelter Cases Shed Light on 
Banks’ Role, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/08/30/AR2005083001915.html (“The fees for providing such tax-
avoidance strategies were substantial. Berce paid Bank One and the co-promoters of 
Homer—Jenkens & Gilchrist PC and Deutsche Bank AG, the German bank that made 
billions of dollars of ‘loans’ to make the deals work—$350,000 in fees.”).  
 99.   See Richter, supra note 32 (discussing the Kadafi regime’s plundering of 
sovereign wealth of Libya). 
 100.   Arnold Beichman, Corruption in Africa, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2006), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/4/20061104-103213-2259r/ (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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The international banks, the western businessmen who bribe to 
get the contract, those who are in cahoots with all the 
millionaires, they are all up to their eyeballs in what is taking 
place.  When it comes to moral standing, everybody belongs in 
the gutter together.
101
 
The United States Senate Investigation on financial crime is 
instructive.  The investigation revealed a wide array of global financial 
institutions that have aided and abetted the plundering of national wealth.
102
  
The Senate Report unequivocally states that banks are the facilitators of 
asset transfers and money laundering.  In one instance, “Mr. Obiang,” a 
political strongman ruling out of Equitorial Guienea, transferred large sums 
out of the country: 
[O]ver a two-month period in 2006, Mr. Obiang was able to 
move $73 million from Equatorial Guinea into the United States 
using wire transfer systems operated by Wachovia Bank; and 
over a four-year period from 2002 to 2006, he was able to move 
$37 million through wire transfer systems operated by 
Citibank.
103
 
The Senate Report further notes: 
This case history shows how a controversial political figure, from 
the ruling family of a country plagued by corruption, moved vast 
amounts of wealth into the U.S. financial system, by employing 
American professionals such as attorneys, real estate and escrow 
agents to help him bypass U.S. AML and PEP controls, and by 
taking advantage of U.S. wire systems unequipped to screen out 
high-dollar transfers sent by PEPs from high-risk countries.  Over 
a four year period, from 2004 to 2008, Teodoro Obiang was able 
to move over $100 million in suspect funds into or through the 
U.S. financial system.
104
 
Another section of the report added: 
Federal law requires U.S. financial institutions to identify the 
name and address of the originator of each wire transfer, in part 
as an AML safeguard.  Yet from 1999 to 2003, Bank of America 
allowed accounts for Pierre, Sonia, and Vincente Falcone to 
receive over $3.6 million in wire transfers from unnamed clients 
using accounts in such known secrecy jurisdictions as the 
Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.  From 
September 2001 to December 2003, the Monthigne account also 
 
 101.   Id. 
 102.  MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 94. 
 103.  Id. at 98. 
 104.  Id. at 105. 
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received a series of payments from hidden “clients,” ranging 
from $100,000 to $400,000 at a time, most often from “one of 
our clients” using a UBS account in Singapore.  In just over two 
years, the payments to Monthigne added up to nearly $2.5 
million.
105
 
The Senate investigation on the relationship between financial 
institutions and former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet
106
 is equally 
compelling: 
Riggs Bank had secretly opened accounts for the former 
President of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, created offshore 
corporations for him, accepted about $8 million in suspect 
deposits, and secretly couriered millions of dollars in cashiers 
checks to him in Chile.  In 2005, a supplemental report by the 
Subcommittee showed that Mr. Pinochet and his family members 
had opened a secret network of over 125 accounts under a variety 
of names at financial institutions operating in the United States.
107
 
According to Senator Carl Levin, “Some banks actively helped 
[Pinochet] hide his funds, others failed to comply with U.S. regulations 
requiring banks to know their customers.”
108
 
Another example includes El Hadj Omar Bongo, the former dictator of 
Gabon, who looted and transferred money from his nation.  With the 
assistance of financial institutions, this wealth was transferred into the 
United States, generating fees for those institutions.
109
 
Nigerian President Sani Abacha was yet another rogue leader who 
plundered his nation’s wealth.  Following his death, a large amount of his 
stolen money was found in banks around the world.
110
  Evidently, billions 
 
 105.  Id. at 256. 
 106.  See Jonathan Kandell, Augusto Pinochet, Dictator Who Ruled by Terror in Chile, 
Dies at 91, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/world/americas/11pinochet.html?pagewanted=all 
(“Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte [was a] brutal dictator who repressed and 
reshaped Chile for nearly two decades and became a notorious symbol of human rights 
abuse and corruption . . . .”). 
 107.  MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 94, at 9-10. 
 108.  Chile’s Pinochet Hid Millions in Secret Accounts, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Mar. 16, 2005), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d2c1ba5a-9626-11d9-ae9d-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz25mXw5HEN. 
 109.  David Randall & Greg Walton, Africa’s Illicit Money Sent to Western Banks, THE 
INDEP. (Feb. 7, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/africas-illicit-
money-sent-to-western-banks-1891512.html (“Once on US soil, the cash was deposited by 
his daughter, Yamilee Bongo-Astier, in a safe deposit box at a New York bank. . . . between 
2000 and 2007, other accounts controlled by this unemployed student were the conduit for 
considerable sums of money.”). 
 110.  See, e.g., Swiss Banks Rapped over Abacha Loot, BBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2000), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/909972.stm (“Several leading banks in Switzerland have 
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of dollars were stolen by Abacha and several family members.
111
  The 
Chairman of the Swiss Banking Commission noted that “[t]he mere fact 
that significant assets of dubious origin, from people close to former 
Nigerian President Sani Abacha, were deposited at Swiss banks is highly 
unsatisfactory and damages the image of Switzerland as a financial 
centre.”
112
  Abacha believed in diversification and spread his billions into 
numerous additional locales, enabling many banks to profit from the 
looting.
113
  “Britain’s financial watchdog, the Financial Services Authority, 
revealed that 23 London banks had handled $1.3bn belonging to family and 
friends of General Abacha.”
114
  Among the other looting profiteers were 
“Germany's Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, France's BNP Paribas and 
Credit Agricole as well as Switzerland's leading banks, Credit Suisse and 
UBS. . . . HSBC, Barclays and NatWest. American banks Goldman Sachs, 
Merrill Lynch and Citibank also feature in the list seen by the FT alongside 
several Nigerian banks.”
115
 
As demonstrated, global banks have profited handsomely from 
conducting business with human rights abusers, dictators, political elites 
and rogue regimes.  The financial institutions were indispensable in 
facilitating theft of literally billions of dollars in various nations.  Without 
the aid of these global titans of capitalism, the fraud and money laundering 
could not be accomplished.  The next section discusses the ATS and how 
historically, commercial fraud was not considered a violation of 
international law. 
III. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
A. The Statute and Litigation 
The Alien Tort Statute provides that: “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
 
been criticised by the country’s regulators for accepting money from the family of the late 
Nigerian military ruler, Sani Abacha.”). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See Elizabeth Olson, Swiss Freeze A Dictator’s Giant Cache, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/26/news/26iht-swiss.2.t_3.html (implicating the 
two largest commercial Swiss banks and several prestigious private banks). 
 114.  Britain Goes after Abacha Millions, BBC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1606565.stm. 
 115.   Greg Morsbach, ‘Abacha Accounts’ to be Frozen, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1576527.stm. 
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States.”
116
 
The statute allows non-U.S. citizens to sue defendants
117
 in federal 
court for tortuous conduct constituting a violation of the law of nations, i.e., 
international law,
118
 or a treaty.  To be cognizable under the ATS, the 
conduct violates the "law of nations" if it contravenes well-established 
recognized norms of international law that involve the mutual interests of 
nations and have the specter of global relationship impact.
119
  Torts that do 
not meet these requirements cannot form the basis of an ATS suit.
120
  
Claims are generally framed in the context of egregious violations of 
human rights such as slavery,
121
 war crimes
122
 and crimes against 
humanity.
123
  However, the statute contains no restrictive language and 
while international law is often framed in a criminal context, suits may be 
based upon violations of international law in other contexts.
124
  Some have 
argued that commercial bribery and egregious corporate fraud may also be 
subject to ATS suits.
125
  Given that transnational corporations are engaging 
in misconduct outside the strict limit of human rights violations, such as 
creating environmental hazards
126
 and violating anti-corruption laws,
127
 it 
may only be a matter of time before such non human rights context conduct 
 
 116.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 117.  Subject to the court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction. Supra n. 10.   
 118.  See Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 116 n.3 (“In this opinion we use the terms ‘law of 
nations’ and ‘customary international law’ interchangeably.”). 
 119.  See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“[C]ustomary international law is composed only of those rules that States universally 
abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.”).  
 120.  See Slawotsky, supra note 14, at 150 (“Many torts have been rejected as predicate 
offenses permitted under the ATCA.”). 
 121.  Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999).  
 122.  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 123.  Doe v. ExxonMobil, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 124.  See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing informed 
medical consent). 
 125.  See Slawotsky, supra note 14 (arguing that severe cases of international business 
fraud should fall within the purview of the ATCA); Vega, supra note 23, at 393–95 
(discussing how foreign bribery is actionable under the ATCA). 
 126.  See Edwards Angell Palmer Dodge LLP, U.S. Lawsuits Based Upon Foreign Toxic 
Tort Liability: A Growing Threat?, MARTINDALE (June 23, 2010), 
http://www.martindale.com/environmental-law/article_Edwards-Angell-Palmer-Dodge-
LLP_1062278.htm (discussing suit against duPont for allegedly exposing textile workers to 
asbestos in the 1990s in Argentina).  
 127.  See Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item, 
N.Y. TIMES (December 20, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html?pagewanted=
all (“But the Siemens case is notable for its breadth, the sums of money involved, and the 
raw organizational zeal with which the company deployed bribes to secure contracts. It is 
also a model of something that was once extremely rare: cross-border cooperation among 
law enforcement officials.”). 
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triggers ATS litigation.
128
 
For nearly 200 years, relatively few cases were filed pursuant to the 
Alien Tort Statute.
129
  This relative dormancy ended when, in Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit issued a landmark ruling that state 
sponsored torture was actionable under the statute.
130
  The issue in Filartiga 
was whether torture constituted a “violation of the law of nations” and was 
thus cognizable under the ATS.
131
  To be actionable, plaintiffs needed to 
establish there was an international consensus with respect to torture being 
a violation of international law.
132
  According to the Second Circuit:  “[i]t is 
only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of 
mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international 
accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law 
violation within the meaning of the [ATS].”
133
 
Filartiga held that in determining whether specific conduct constituted 
a violation of international law, a court was to examine judicial opinions, 
scholarly works, and custom.
134
  Significantly, the court stated that 
international law had to be applied as it is used “today” and not as it was 
understood 200 hundred years prior,
135
 noting that international law evolves 
over time.
136
  The Second Circuit found that torture was violative of a 
“well-established, universally recognized norm . . . of international law” 
which was cognizable under the statute.”
137
 
After Filartiga, plaintiffs began vigorously filing ATS cases.  Such 
cases included ones against government officials alleging various human 
rights abuses.
138
  Plaintiffs also began suing corporations, often alleging 
these defendants aided and abetted the governments or officials in violating 
international law.
139
 
 
 128.  For example, a Turkish company recently filed a case against a South African 
company for allegedly bribing Iranian officials to procure lucrative contracts.  See 
Schoenberg & Lakshmanan, supra note 24 (discussing litigation between Turkcell Iletisim 
Hizmetleri AS (TCELL), a Turkish company, and its Johannesburg-based rival). 
 129.  See ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the temporary 
dearth of ATCA cases). 
 130.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 131.  Id. at 878. 
 132.  Id. at 888. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 880-81. 
 135.  Id. at 887. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 888. 
 138.  See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (pertaining to a situation where families of victims of torture, summary execution 
and disappearance sued the former president of the Philippines). 
 139.  See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part & rev’d 
in part 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing an incident where plaintiffs brought suit 
SLAWOTSKY_UPDATED WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/2013  12:58 PM 
982 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
In Sosa v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court addressed the ATS and held 
that the statute is jurisdictional,
140
 thus permitting federal courts to 
adjudicate cases brought by aliens for violations of international law, 
noting such law was part of federal common law.
141
  The Court held the 
statute was initially intended to encompass the three primary violations of 
international law at the time of its enactment:  piracy, offenses against 
ambassadors, and violations of safe passage.
142
  However, the Court 
endorsed the Filartiga view that international law develops over time and 
held courts were available to entertain claims for violations of the “present-
day law of nations”.
143
  Sosa cited approvingly to Filartiga, stating that , 
“[t]he position we take today has been assumed by some federal courts  for 
24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga. . . .”
144
  
Simultaneously, the Court urged caution with respect to embracing the 
types of international law violations that should be cognizable.  The Court 
provided some guidance, namely, to come within the ambit of the ATS, a 
violation should:  “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world . . . [and] defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the 18
th
 century paradigms.”
145
 
Thus, subject to diligent gatekeeping, the federal courts are 
empowered to adjudicate cases brought by aliens for violations of 
international law other than the three original paradigm examples.
146
 
B. What Conduct is Actionable 
1. Sosa: Cognizable conduct must be universally condemned, specific, 
and touch the mutual interest of nations. 
Cognizable tortuous conduct under international law is not unlimited. 
While the Sosa court embraced and approved of Filartiga’s “evolving 
international law” motif, the Court envisioned a limited number of 
cognizable torts.  New torts could be recognized but the lower federal 
courts were to exercise restraint in permitting new claims.  The Court 
 
against the government of Myanmar and several oil companies for human rights violations 
allegedly arising out of activities connected with the construction of an oil pipeline). 
 140.  Sosa v. Alvarez, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004). 
 141.  Id. at 720. 
 142.  Id. at 724-725. 
 143.  Id. at 725. 
 144.  Id. at 731. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Courts remain subject to the ability to exercise jurisdiction over defendants.  
Foreign defendants may be able to defend such claims by raising the defense of 
extraterritoriality. Supra note 10.  
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stated: “[a]ny claim based on the present-day law of nations [must] rest on 
a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century 
paradigms.”
147
 
The principle mechanism for screening out claims is the requirement 
that the conduct be the subject of universal condemnation, specific and of 
joint interest as opposed to the several interest of a single or just a few 
nations. Sosa held that qualifying conduct must constitute: 
(1) . . .  a norm of international character that States universally 
abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation; (2) . . .  
defined with a specificity comparable to the 18th-century 
paradigms discussed in Sosa; and (3) . . . of mutual concern to 
States.
148
 
The Sosa court wanted to ensure that lower courts do not entertain 
suits based upon conduct that was less serious than the paradigm offenses 
of “piracy, violations of safe passage and attacks on ambassadors.”
149
  As 
detailed below, financial crime qualifies under the Sosa definition as 
offenses that are similar in nature to the archetype offenses. 
a. Universally Condemned 
Plaintiffs “must allege the violation of a norm of customary 
international law to which States universally subscribe.”
150
  The Second 
Circuit, in ascertaining whether medical experimentation was universally 
condemned, stated that “[t]he prohibition on nonconsensual medical 
experimentation . . . is specific, focused and accepted by nations around the 
world without significant exception.”
151
 
The question, therefore, is whether financial crime is conduct which is 
prohibited throughout the world.  If financial crime is indeed held illegal to 
this extent, the first factor of the Sosa requirement is satisfied. 
b. Specific 
To be cognizable, the conduct must not be “less definite [in] content  . 
 
 147.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 148.  Id. at 725-28. 
 149.  Id. at 694 (“[T]he ATS was intended to have practical effect . . . . on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number 
of international law violations thought to carry personal liability at the time: offenses against 
ambassadors, violation of safe conducts, and piracy.”). 
 150.  Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 151.  Id.  
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. . than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.”
152
  
With respect to this prong, the Second Circuit stated that it had “little 
trouble concluding that [the norm] . . . is every bit as concrete—indeed 
even more so—than the norm prohibiting piracy . . . or the interference 
with the right of safe conducts and the rights of ambassadors . . . .”
153
 
Aspirations or general goals are insufficient.  For example, in Flomo v. 
Firestone, plaintiffs alleged that Firestone violated international law by 
using child labor.
154
  The court rejected that claim.  Plaintiffs relied upon 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) which 
states children have the right not to perform “any work that is likely to be 
hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the 
child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social 
development.”
155
  The Flomo court found this “too vague and 
encompassing to create an international legal norm.”
156
 
The court similarly found plaintiffs’ reliance on ILO Convention 138: 
Minimum Age Convention (1973) misplaced.  The convention “provides 
that children should not be allowed to do other than ‘light work’ unless 
they're at least 14 years old.”
157
  The court stated that “the concept of light 
work is vague, and it must vary a great deal across nations because of 
variance in social and economic conditions.”
158
  Thus, in examining this 
part of the inquiry, the question is whether financial crime is prohibited by 
definite and concrete laws. 
c. Mutual interest 
The third benchmark in determining whether the conduct is actionable 
is examining whether the wrongdoing is of “mutual” concern to nations as 
opposed to “several” concern wherein nations are separately interested.
159
  
A significant component is whether the conduct in question is “capable of 
impairing international peace and security.”
160
  Indicia of mutual concern 
are: whether nations have prohibited through domestic legislation the 
conduct and whether the conduct is the subject of condemnation through 
“express international accords”.
161
 
 
 152.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
 153.  Pfizer, 562 F.3d at 184. 
 154.  Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 155.  Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 54. 
 156.  Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022. 
 157.  Id.  
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 160.  Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 161.  Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888. 
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Mutual interest has been defined as occurring when “the nations [of 
the world] have made it their business, both through international accords 
and unilateral action,” to express their mutual desire to thwart the 
misconduct.
162
  Mutual interest can also be found when the conduct “poses 
a real threat to international peace and security.”
163
   
The court was discussing whether the failure to obtain informed 
consent constituted conduct that was in the mutual interest of the nations.  
The court cited to media reports that the pharmaceutical company’s 
disastrous vaccination efforts impeded global efforts to eradicate polio.  
The court in Pfizer stated: 
The Associated Press reported that the Trovan trials in Kano 
apparently engendered such distrust in the local population that it 
was a factor contributing to an eleven month-long, local boycott 
of a polio vaccination campaign in 2004, which impeded 
international and national efforts to vaccinate the population 
against a polio outbreak with catastrophic results.
164
 
The Second Circuit noted that “administration of drug trials without 
informed consent on the scale alleged in the complaints directly threatens 
these efforts because such conduct fosters distrust and resistance to 
international drug trials, cutting edge medical innovation, and critical 
international public health initiatives in which pharmaceutical companies 
play a key role.”
165
  The court’s ruling noted “the cross-border spread of 
contagious diseases . . . is a significant threat to international peace and 
stability.”
166
 
The court also noted that “the administration of drug trials without 
informed consent also poses threats to national security by impairing our 
relations with other countries. . . [T]he failure to secure consent for human 
experimentation has the potential to generate substantial anti-American 
animus and hostility.”
167
  
The requirements of condemnation, specificity and mutual interest are 
intended to ensure that only conduct of sufficient similarity to the three 
paradigm cardinal offenses are permitted to serve as a basis for an ATS 
suit. 
 
 162.  Id. at 889. 
 163.  Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 185 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 164.  Id. at 186. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id.  
 167.  Id. at 187. 
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2. Personal Injuries Arising in the Context of Egregious Human 
Rights Violations 
Post-Sosa, courts have applied the Supreme Court’s admonition and 
have gauged the alleged conduct according to whether the benchmarks 
exist.  Conduct must be a violation of a norm of international law that is 
defined and accepted comparatively with the three cardinal offenses.  The 
archetype case involves some aspect of human rights abuses such as crimes 
against humanity, extra-judicial execution, war crimes, slavery and 
torture.
168
 
Recent cases underscore this commonality.  In Exxon v. Doe, plaintiffs 
alleged the defendant aided and abetted Indonesian security forces who 
murdered, tortured, and sexually assaulted villagers while protecting oil 
facilities.
169
  The court referred to such conduct as “heinous”.
170
  In Flomo 
v. Firestone Rubber, plaintiffs alleged that child labor conditions were 
harsh and abusive.
171
  In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, plaintiffs claimed the defendant 
aided and abetted the PNG military genocide and war crimes.
172
 
While traditionally the cognizable conduct has been focused on human 
rights abuses and the subsequent personal injury associated with the 
misconduct, this is not a requirement of the statute.  In Pfizer, the court 
held that a multinational pharmaceutical company violated international 
law.
173
  Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant failed to obtain informed 
consent from the parents of children given a drug in response to meningitis.  
The drug was alleged to be unsafe and some of the children died and others 
received serious personal injuries.  The court found that international law 
banned administering drugs without informed consent.  This demonstrates 
ATS jurisdiction is not solely limited to violent misconduct such as slavery, 
torture, genocide, and crimes against humanity.  There is no limitation as to 
the conduct—only that the conduct contravenes well-established norms of 
international law.  As the next section discusses, to date, courts have been 
unprepared to find that financial fraud violates international law. 
 
 168.  See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005) (alleging 
defendant visited plaintiff in an Chilean prison with a “caravan of death” and inflicted a 
brutal death on a civilian using a special knife designed to inflict a slow and agonizing 
death); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (accusing defendant of leading rape 
and forced impregnations on civilians during civil war in Yugoslavia); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (discussing the infliction of a tortuous death); Iwanowa v. Ford, 67 F. 
Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999) (claiming defendant profited from slave labor during 
World War II).  
 169.  Doe v. ExxonMobil, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 170.  Id. at 15. 
 171.  Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 172.  Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 173.  Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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3. Commercial Conduct 
Courts have been unwilling to recognize commercial conduct as 
cognizable under the ATS.  The rationale used by these courts is that the 
various financial crimes alleged do not constitute violations of international 
law. 
In Lopes v. Schroeder, the plaintiff based his ATS suit upon the 
unseaworthiness of the defendant's vessel and the defendant's negligence.
174
   
The court framed the question as “whether the ‘tort [of unseaworthiness]’ 
was 'committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.’”
175
  The court held that the practice of awarding damages for 
injuries arising from unseaworthiness was a uniquely American concept 
and “the doctrine does not come from the law of nations nor from any 
treaty to which the United States is a party.”
176
  Defining the law of nations 
as “a violation by one or more individuals of those standards, rules or 
customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an 
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their 
common good and/or in dealings inter se,”
177
 the court rejected jurisdiction, 
finding that the allegations did not constitute a violation of the law of 
nations.  While the specific allegation was not fraud, the Lopes ruling is 
important because most of the courts rejecting commercial fraud cite to 
Lopes and its question-framing in support of their rulings. 
In Valanga v. Metropolitan Life, plaintiff alleged the defendant insurer 
violated international law, thus triggering ATS jurisdiction by refusing to 
pay a claim based upon the claimant’s residence within the “Iron Curtain” 
of the former Soviet Union, despite being listed with such an address on the 
policy.
178
  The court rejected plaintiff’s contention holding, “[i]t is injected 
with overtones which impinge upon the standards which nations have 
established to control their relationships with one another.”
179
 
The court added that qualifying conduct has to have an “international 
import” which could “constitute an affront to the power and dignity of the 
nation involved.”
180
 
IIT v. Vencap did deal with commercial fraud with an “international 
import.”
181
  In Vencap, plaintiff alleged defendant had engaged in 
 
 174.  Lopes v. Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D.Pa. 1963). 
 175.  Id. at 294. 
 176.  Id. at 295. 
 177.  Id. at 297. 
 178.  Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.Pa. 1966). 
 179.  Id. at 328. 
 180.  Id. 
   183.    IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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international fraudulent conduct, resulting in substantial economic losses.  
Theories of liability explored in the case included making false and 
misleading statements in violation of SEC Rule 10-b; an inherently 
fraudulent scheme within the meaning of 10b-5(a); conspiracy to defraud; 
and defrauding of investors by defendant’s improper diversion of funds to 
use as a private loan.In addressing plaintiff’s ATS claim, the Second 
Circuit noted: 
We cannot subscribe to plaintiffs' view that the Eighth 
Commandment "Thou shalt not steal" is part of the law of 
nations.  While every civilized nation doubtless has this as a part 
of its legal system, a violation of the law of nations arises only 
when there has been "a violation by one or more individuals of 
those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship 
between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and 
(b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings 
inter se.
182
 
Thus, Vencap relied upon Lopes’s reasoning that actionable conduct must 
constitute a violation of a norm of international law.  Since the fraudulent 
conduct was found not to encompass an international law violation, the 
court rejected fraud as the basis for an ATS claim. 
In Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, plaintiffs claimed defendants 
defrauded them by promising them executive jobs,
183
 executive training in 
the United States, and subsequent employment with a large oil company in 
their native country.
184
  The basis of their suit was fraud–they were trained 
to be service station attendants rather than corporate executives.
185
  The 
court affirmed dismissal of the ATS suit, stating that although fraud is 
immoral and unlawful in many nations, the type of conduct alleged was 
simply not of an international character.
186
 
In Trans-Continental Investment Corp. v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 
plaintiffs claimed defendants defrauded and breached fiduciary duties to 
them.
187
  Specifically, plaintiffs claimed they deposited large amounts of 
money with defendant banks and were assured access to loans.
188
  They 
alleged that, contrary to promises, they did not receive loans, and their 
 
 
 182.  Id. at  1015 (citing Lopes, 225 F. Supp. at 297). 
 183.  Abiodun v. Martin Oil Servs. Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 184.  Id. at 143. 
 185.  Id. at 144. 
 186.  Id. at 145. 
 187.  Trans-Cont’l Inv. Corp. v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp. 565 (C.D.Cal. 
1980). 
 188.  Id. at 567. 
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deposited money was never returned to them.
189
  The court rejected ATS 
jurisdiction, finding that the alleged fraud did not involve a universally-
recognized norm.
190
  The court, citing to Vencap, stated the conduct has to 
involve either state relations or relations from states to citizens in order to 
properly invoke ATS jurisdiction.
191
 
In Cohen v. Hartman, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an 
ATS claim wherein the defendants were accused of embezzlement and 
money laundering.
192
  The court stated that the complaint was properly 
dismissed as the claim was “in no way based on a violation of the ‘law of 
nations.’”
193
  The court noted that if a dispute does not involve international 
relations there is no cognizable claim.
194
  The court held that while every 
nation forbids robbery, this rule is not “part of the law of nations,”
195
 and 
therefore no jurisdiction could be found. 
In Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, defendants acquired banks in the 
United States, allegedly misappropriating funds and defrauding 
government regulators.
196
  The plaintiffs alleged that “[b]y making the bank 
appear to be in better financial condition than it really was” and “using 
bribery and fraud” the bank was looted by “pirates . . . in business suits.”
197
  
Bank depositors lost money and loans made to bank insiders were never 
repaid, resulting in the bank’s collapse.
198
 
The Ninth Circuit noted the claims were for “fraud, breach of duty and 
misappropriation of funds.”
199
  The court rejected ATS jurisdiction holding, 
“[a]lthough the conduct was international in scope . . . [the] looting of a 
bank by its insiders, and misrepresentations about the bank’s financial 
condition, have never been in the traditional classification of international 
law.”
200
 
The court cited to Vencap and found that the violations of domestic 
statues and banking regulations did not constitute international law 
violations.
201
  Again, the lynchpin in the court’s decision was the court’s 
finding that financial crime has “never been in the traditional classification 
 
 189.  Id. at 567-68. 
 190.  Id. at 569. 
 191.  Id. at 570. 
 192.  Cohen v. Hartman, 634 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 193.  Id. at 319. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 320. 
 196.  Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 197.  Id. at 1414. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. at 1418. 
 200.  Id. at 1411. 
 201.  Id. 
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of international law.”
202
 
In Arndt v. UBS, plaintiffs alleged the defendant was liable for fraud 
and conversion.
203
  The court held the proper inquiry was to determine 
whether the conduct was the subject of mutual concern and expressed in 
international agreements.
204
  Since the conduct failed to meet this 
requirement the court rejected ATS jurisdiction.
205
  The UBS decision 
represented the first time in which a court opened the possibility of 
entertaining such a claim.  While it ultimately rejected the suit, the court 
based its ruling on a lack of evidence that the fraud was an issue of mutual 
concern.  In its decision, the court left open the possibility that, had such 
evidence existed or presented, the court would presumably have found 
jurisdiction to be proper. 
While the above-referenced opinions denied ATS jurisdiction based 
on the absence of international law violations, in each of these decisions the 
respective courts suggested that to be cognizable, the conduct in question 
must violate an international law norm, holding that financial crimes were 
simply not within the traditional realm of international law.  This second 
assertion stems from the decision in Price Waterhouse, which stands for 
the proposition that financial crime is not associated with violations of 
international law.
206
  The UBS ruling corroborates this principle, basing its 
holding on a substantial lack of evidence that financial crime is the subject 
of international agreement that touches upon the mutual interest of nations. 
Notwithstanding these rulings, financial crime does, in fact, affect the 
nations of the world.  As the world has changed, such conduct can no 
longer be characterized as outside the ambit of international law.  As the 
global financial system is interrelated, criminal activity such as money 
laundering has emerged as a critical concern within the realm of 
international law.  As the next section details, international conventions, 
laws, and other sources demonstrate that the international community 
widely condemns such conduct.  Further, the financial crimes the global 
community condemns are not vague, but specific and definable misconduct 
that affects the mutual interests of nations.  Indeed, by virtue of our 
globalized and interconnected markets, financial crime affects nearly every 
nation, making it one of the most pressing issues facing the international 
community. 
 
 202.  Id. at 1418. 
 203.  Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 204.  Id. at 141 
 205.  Id. 
   206. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d  at 1418. 
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IV.  SHOULD FINANCIAL CRIMES BE COGNIZABLE? 
The global community now recognizes the significance of corruption, 
fraud and money laundering.
207
  Such misconduct is almost unanimously 
acknowledged as destructive and is condemned across the world.  The 
struggle against financial crime is a global fight enjoying the support of the 
vast majority, if not the unanimous agreement, of civilized nations.  As the 
United Nations stated, “[t]here is a collective responsibility now, 
worldwide, to track stolen money, to share intelligence . . .  .”
208
 
The OECD noted that the Anti-Bribery Convention was significant 
because it represented an international, united front against global financial 
crime, stating, “[the] Anti-Bribery Convention [] provides the framework 
for a united stand against corruption by the international community.”
209
 
The global condemnation of financial crime arose from compelling 
motivations.  In today’s interconnected financial markets, lawbreakers can 
move huge amounts of money instantaneously, and safely store proceeds of 
misconduct in a far away land.  A dictator or financial tyrant can loot a 
nation’s assets, pillage national treasuries, and impoverish the citizenry by 
diverting wealth abroad.  Rogue leaders can enlist large global corporations 
to launder money and facilitate transfers of wealth. 
Moreover, fraudsters can engage in schemes with far reaching effects. 
Indeed, fraud even can have global implications.  As the United States 
SEC’s OIA states: 
Technological advances have facilitated the movement of capital 
across borders and increased investment opportunities for 
investors.  However, these same advances also have enhanced the 
ability of those who prey on investors to transfer assets abroad or 
base their scams and fraudulent activities overseas in an effort to 
avoid detection and prosecution.  As a consequence, securities 
regulators and other law enforcement and governmental agencies 
 
 207.  In a 2011 speech, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer noted that:  
[I]t has become increasingly clear over the past year that the trend across the 
globe is toward criminalization of foreign bribery.  The U.K. Bribery Act took 
effect in July.  Russia recently passed an anti-bribery law; has ratified the U.N. 
Convention against Corruption; and is expected soon to accede to the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention.  China, too, recently passed an anti-bribery law and is 
an observer at the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery.  
Breuer, supra note 3. 
 208.  Press Release, Dept. of Pub. Information, Convention Against Corruption Ratified 
by 30th State, U.N. Press Release L/T/4389 (Sept. 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/lt4389.doc.htm. 
 209.  Does the OECD Convention Work?, OECD OBSERVER (Dec. 2004-Jan.2005), 
available at http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1509. 
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may find that reliance on domestic enforcement abilities is no 
longer sufficient to combat cross-border securities fraud.  Strong 
international cooperation is vital to the quick, effective and 
appropriate resolution of international enforcement 
investigations.
210
 
A. The effects of financial fraud are felt far and wide. 
Linked markets can spread fraud like a contagion and the explosive 
rise in derivatives can multiply its consequences.   Therefore, based upon 
their mutual interests, states have banded together to condemn, criminalize, 
prosecute fraud, money laundering and corruption, and to retrieve the ill-
gotten gains arising from such conduct.  As detailed in the following 
section, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption; the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery, various laws enacted, and the World 
Bank’s sanctions against entities engaged in fraud all demonstrate that 
fraud, bribery, and money laundering are contemptible acts condemned by 
the vast majority of civilized nations. 
B. The Overwhelming International Condemnation of Financial 
Crime 
1.         The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
Nearly 150 nations have signed The United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC).  The purposes of the UNCAC include 
combating corruption, promoting integrity, and increasing international 
cooperation.
211
  The convention obligates parties to enact laws and 
prosecute misconduct, including the bribery of national and foreign public 
officials, as well as officials of public international organizations; the 
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of either public or 
private funds by a public official to whom the funds have been entrusted; 
and the laundering of proceeds of crime.
212
 
 
 210. International Enforcement Assistance, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_crossborder.shtml (last modified Nov. 13, 2012). 
 211.  United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. Doc A/58/422 (Oct. 31, 
2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4374b9524.html. 
 212.  Id. at 17.  
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2. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions 
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions provides further evidence 
of universal condemnation.  Approximately 40 nations have signed the 
OECD Convention, which obligates parties to enact laws making money 
laundering, as well as the bribery of foreign officials in international 
business, illegal.
213
  The OECD Convention urges international cooperation 
on these issues, obligating signatory countries to enact domestic anti-
bribery laws criminalizing bribery of foreign officials.
214
 
3. World Bank Sanctions Board 
Another indication of the global condemnation of financial fraud is the 
World Bank Sanctions Board, which debars parties found to have engaged 
in fraud from conducting business with the World Bank and other 
developmental banks.
215
  Recently, the World Bank decided to publish its 
debarment rulings.  Their decision is significant in itself by providing 
powerful evidence that they take financial crime seriously.  The World 
Bank demonstrates its condemnation of financial crimes such as forgery, 
bribery, and fraud in its recently published decisions.
216
 
4. UN Convention Against Narcotics Trafficking 
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances provides a thorough description of the 
precise elements that constitute each offense described in the convention.  
As stated by the agreement: 
 
 213.  List of OECD Member Countries – Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
http://www.oecd.org/general/listofoecdmembercountries-
ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm (last visited May 4, 2013). 
 214.  OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, art. 1, Nov. 21, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 
I.L.M. 1.  
 215.  Pursuant to a cross-debarment agreement, these other banks agree to debar such 
parties as well.  See Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight Against Corruption, THE 
WORLD BANK (Apr. 10, 2010), http://go.worldbank.org/B699B73Q00 (listing cooperating 
multilateral development banks including the World Bank Group, African Development 
Bank Group, Asian development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and Inter-American Development Bank Group). 
 216.  See Sanctions Board Decisions, supra note 22 (linking to numerous World Bank 
Sanction Board Decisions condemning financial crimes).  
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Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offenses under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally: 
 
. . . the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such a 
property is derived from any offence or offences established in 
accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an 
act of participation in such offence or offences, for purposes of 
concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of 
assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such 
offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his 
actions. . . . 
The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, 
location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or 
ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived 
from an offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation 
in such an offence or offences . . ..
217
 
 
The Treaty states that each state party should render as criminal: “[t]he 
acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of the 
receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or offences 
established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from 
an act of participation in such offence or offences.”
218
 
The Treaty also emphasizes and obligates states to cooperate in 
identifying and seizing assets that are the results of the drug-related 
activity, and that each party should take measures “to identify, trace, seize, 
freeze or forfeit property or proceeds located in the requested states, where 
property was allegedly derived from or used in drug trafficking and drug 
money laundering in violation of laws of the requesting state.”
219
 
        The Treaty makes money laundering an extraditable offense.  Because 
all parties are obliged to establish article 3(1) offences as criminal offences 
in the domestic law, any requirements of dual criminality in a party's 
extradition, that is, the offence is criminal in both jurisdictions, should be 
met.
220
 
The importance of this latter provision cannot be understated.  
 
 217.  United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances art. 3(1)(b), Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 218.  Id. at art. 3(1)(c). 
 219.  Id. at art. 5. 
 220.  Id. at art. 3(1).  
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Pursuant to the Treaty, drug-related money laundering is a universally-
recognized, extraditable offense. 
5. United Nations Convention Against Organized Transnational 
Crime in Palermo, Italy  
The United Nations Convention against Organized Transnational 
Crime obligates nations to enact anti-money laundering laws.
221
  Each 
member state must:  criminalize money laundering,
222
 enact regulatory 
mechanisms to discover and prevent all money laundering (such as 
customer identification, record keeping, and reporting of suspicious 
transactions)
,223
 and states must approve international co-operation between 
regulatory and law enforcement agencies.
.224 
 
6.       The Financial Action Task Force 
 
       The G-7 founded the FATF in 1989 in response to the international 
problem of money laundering.
225
  The motivation for creating the FATF 
was international concern with  “combating money laundering, terrorist 
financing and the financing of proliferation, and other related threats to the 
integrity of the international financial system.”
226
  Stability of the global 
financial system is a key goal of the FATF as it aims to protect the 
international financial system from misuse.
227
 
In conjunction with the United Nations, the IMF and World Bank, the 
FATF has developed specific recommendations to combat financial 
crime.
228
  According to the FATF, the definition of money laundering is 
broad; “[c]ountries should apply the crime of money laundering to all 
serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate 
offences.”
229
  The FATF calls for nations to identify, trace and confiscate 
 
 221.  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 
55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001).   
 222.  Id. at art. 6. 
 223.  Id. at art. 7. 
 224.  Id. at art. 7(1)(b). 
 225.  About Us, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ 
(last visited  May 4, 2013). 
 226.  International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism & Proliferation 7, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (last 
visited, May 4, 2013).   
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. at 8. 
 229.  Id. at 12 (Recommendation 3). 
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money laundering proceeds.
230
  Moreover, financial institutions are to 
“know the customer” and identify owners and beneficial owners.
231
  Global 
cooperation is called for on investigating, seizing and returning assets.
232
 
Special focus is on the potential for political elites to plunder their 
national assets for personal gain.  To prevent the proceeds of financial 
crime from being enjoyed, a Recommendation is specifically applicable to 
politically “exposed” individuals.  Financial institutions are obligated, with 
respect to foreign PEPs (politically exposed persons), to: 
(a) have appropriate risk-management systems to determine 
whether the customer or the beneficial owner is a politically 
exposed person; (b) obtain senior management approval for 
establishing (or continuing, for existing customers) such business 
relationships; (c) take reasonable measures to establish the source 
of wealth and source of funds; and (d) conduct enhanced ongoing 
monitoring of the business relationship.
233
  
These requirements apply not only to the leaders themselves but “also 
apply to family members or close associates of such PEPs.”
234
 
The FATF Recommendations provide another powerful example of 
global condemnation of financial crime.  They signify a global effort at 
criminalizing financial crime with a specific emphasis on preventing 
political leaders from plundering their citizens’ wealth through transactions 
with financial institutions. 
7. The United Nations Security Council 
The World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001 engendered 
renewed concern regarding financing of terrorism.  In response, the United 
Nations enacted Resolution 1373 to be carried out by all states.  Resolution 
1373 addresses global finance norms in the context of crimes and, 
specifically terrorism, ordering nations to: 
[T]hwart and stem the financing of terrorist acts; criminalize 
operations linked with the financing of terrorism; freeze assets 
related to terrorism; prevent funds being made available to 
individuals linked to terrorism; reject sanctuary to individuals 
who finance terrorism and prevent them from entering their 
territoriality.
235
 
 
 230.  Id. (Recommendation 4). 
 231.  Id. at 14 (Recommendation 10). 
 232.  Id. at 26-30 (Recommendations 36-40).   
 233.  Id. at 16 (Recommendation 12). 
 234.  Id.  
 235.  S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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The resolution notes the link between global crime and money 
laundering.
236
 
There is near universal denunciation of financial crime such as 
corruption, money laundering, and fraud.  These condemnations are not 
merely vague goals or general aspirations.  They have led to specific and 
definable laws. 
C. Specific and Definable 
The second requirement of an ATS cognizable international law 
violation is that the conduct be definable and specific.  Vague standards are 
not sufficient to vest ATS plaintiffs with rights.  The hallmark of fulfilling 
this requirement is that the norm of conduct be specific and definable, mere 
aspersions and general claims are inadequate.  Courts have rejected suits 
that based solely upon “the right to health” and the “right to liberty.”  
Rejecting the generic and unspecific “universal rights” claims is justifiable 
and in keeping with Sosa’s admonition.  If courts were to allow such claims 
it would be a slippery slope.  Under this standard, one could claim 
violations of “education rights”, “the right to vote,” or “universal 
healthcare.”  Such claims are general, vague, and lack international 
consensus on the definition of “rights.”   
Nations have enacted laws dealing specifically with financial crimes.  
As one scholar noted, “[g]lobal efforts to stem bribery of foreign officials 
in international business transactions are accelerating.  Anti-bribery 
criminal enforcement by many different nations increased significantly in 
the last decade.  The United Kingdom's new Bribery Act took effect in 
July, 2011.  Russia enacted new anti-bribery legislation restraining 
its businesses' conduct abroad.”
237
 
Even China has joined the anti-corruption crusade and has condemned 
and criminalized corruption.
238
  These laws define various financial crimes 
in detail.  While the many domestic laws are tailored to the specific 
domestic legal system, culture and language, the definitions of what 
constitutes the offenses are by and large quite similar.  This similarity 
reinforces the universal nature of the condemnation and is no doubt 
influenced by the conventions and above-mentioned treaties. 
 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Elizabeth K. Spahn, Local Law Provisions Under the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM., 249, 250-51 (2012); see also Elizabeth K. 
Spahn, Multi-Jurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012) (discussing the universal outcry and criminalization 
of bribery). 
 238.  Spahn, Local Law Provisions, supra note 237 at 252. 
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1. United States 
 
Enacted in 1977, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) outlaws 
corruption of foreign officials and fraudulent record keeping.
239
  The statute 
is both criminal and civil and prohibits U.S. citizens and corporations 
paying something of “value” with corrupt intent made in order to obtain a 
business advantage.
240
  The bookkeeping provision obligates businesses to 
properly maintain books and records and internal controls to track 
transactions and dispositions of assets.
241
  Non-U.S. nationals and 
businesses are also subject to the FCPA’s bribery section if present in the 
U.S. and to “issuers”
242
 as well as foreign ADR listers.
243
  Criminal 
imprisonment is available up to 5 years per bribery violation and 20 years 
for books and records violations.
244
  The FCPA is interpreted broadly and 
prosecutors pursue cases where the conduct “concerns” the U.S. and 
directors/officers may be liable under a control person theory.
245
  Numerous 
companies have been heavily fined.
246
  Siemens paid a large fine in 2008.
247
 
The United States has various anti-money laundering laws.  For 
example, the Money Laundering Control Act 1986 (MLCA)
248
 imposes 
criminal liability on anyone who knowingly uses or attempts to use the 
proceeds of some unlawful activity in some form of financial transaction 
 
 239.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1999)). 
 240.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006).  There are exceptions and defenses such as the 
payments being legal under the local written law, reasonable expenditures to promote and 
market and facilitating payments to expedite routine governmental functions.  See generally 
A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, CRIMINAL DIV. OF U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE AND ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf (outlining the SEC and DOJ 
approach to compliance with the FCPA). 
 241.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006). 
 242.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). 
 243.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2006). 
 244.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(e)(2)(A) (2006); 15 
U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006). 
 245.  See Press Release, SEC Charges Three Oil Services Executives With Bribing 
Customs Officials in Nigeria (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-
32.htm (“He also is liable as a control person under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for 
violations of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions.”) 
 246.  In 2011 many companies were fined.  Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 4-8  (2012). 
 247.  Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Litig. Release No. 20829, SEC Files Settled 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide 
Bribery With Total Disgorgement and Criminal Fines of Over $1.6 Billion (Dec. 15, 2008), 
http:// www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm. 
 248.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2006). 
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with the intent to either promote the carrying on of a “specified” unlawful 
activity (SUA) or engages in a transaction designed to disguise or conceal 
the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the funds.   
2. United Kingdom 
The UK law – the UK Bribery Act – is similar but stricter than the 
FCPA:  
Specifically, the first general offense under the UK Bribery Act 
2010 is offering, promising, or giving a financial or other 
advantage in any of the three following circumstances:  (1) to 
induce a person to improperly perform a relevant function or 
duty; (2) to reward a person for such improper activity; or (3) to 
know or believe that the acceptance of the advantage would itself 
be an improper performance of a function or duty.
249
 
Unlike the FCPA, the U.K. law is applicable to private parties.
250
  The 
U.K. law also criminalizes the act of receiving the bribe and failing to 
prevent the bribery.
251
  Under the U.K. law, the sole defense to “failure to 
prevent” prosecution is demonstrating that the business had “adequate 
procedures” in place to prevent the persons associated with it from 
undertaking bribery. 
The U.K. law’s extraterritorial jurisdictional effect is far-reaching.  
Individuals or companies that are nationals, and companies that conduct 
some part of their business within the U.K., are all subject to the law, 
regardless of where the act was committed.
252
  Both civil and criminal 
penalties are available.
253
 
The U.K. criminalizes money laundering.
254
  The law is very similar to 
most national anti-money laundering statutes including verification of 
customer requirements, mandatory reporting of suspicious activity and 
providing both civil and criminal penalties.
255
 
 
 249.  Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United States 
and United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 MO. L. REV. 
415, 441 (2011). 
250  Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6 (U.K.).   
 251. Id. at § 7. 
 252.  Id. at § 12. 
 253.  Id. at § 11. 
 254.  See Money Laundering Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2157, art. 5, ¶ 45 (calling one who 
violates the regulations “guilty of an offence” and listing potential consequences, including 
imprisonment). 
 255.  Id. 
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D. Other National Laws 
Across the globe, many nations have enacted specific regulations and 
laws criminalizing financial crime.
256
  Vietnam’s anti-money laundering 
law obligates reporting of suspicious activities and blocking accounts.
257
  
Thailand also requires reporting of suspicious transactions.
258
  Under a 
2011 amendment, the laws became stricter and now apply to wire transfers 
and financial institutions such as futures dealers. 
China has laws criminalizing both money laundering
259
 and 
corruption.
260
  Chinese money laundering laws are similar to other nations’ 
laws, and their bribery prohibition relates to both governmental and 
commercial bribery.
261
  China is actively prosecuting such crimes.
262
  
Russian laws criminalize money laundering and comport with international 
standards of identifying customers, reporting suspicious activity and 
prosecuting offenders.
263
 
Israel has enacted anti-money laundering laws similar to international 
standards.
264
  The law requires banks to know their customer, report 
 
 256.  See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/oecdanti-
briberyconventionnationalimplementinglegislation.html (listing countries with laws 
implementing the anti-bribery convention).  
 257.  Penal Code, Decree 74 (2005) (Viet.). 
 258.  Anti-Money Laundering Act, B.E. 2542 (No.3), B.E. 2552 (2009) (Thai.), available 
at http://www.lawreform.go.th/lawreform/images/th/content/th/500/c500_2.pdf (unofficial 
English translation). 
 259.  Anti-Money Laundering Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) (China).  
 260.  Comparison of the FCPA and Chinese Antibribery Laws and Regulations as of 
March 2012 and Japanese and United Kingdom Antibribery Laws and Regulations as of 
March 2011, SQUIRE SANDERS (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2012/05/international_labor
_employment_law_committee_midyear_meeting/mw2012int_millstone-
1.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  See, e.g., David Barboza, China Sentences Rio Tinto Employees in Bribe Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/business/global/30riotinto.html (discussing China’s 
prosecution of “[f]our employees of the British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto, including 
an Australian citizen,” who “were found guilty . . . of accepting millions of dollars in bribes 
and stealing commercial secrets. They were given sentences of 7 years to 14 years in prison, 
and were later dismissed by their employer.”). 
 263.  See Julia Fedorova, Money Laundering | Russia, CMS (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://www.cmslegal.ru/Money-Laundering—Russia-03-21-2011 (noting that the law 
reflects “global developments” in combating money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism).  
 264.  See Prohibition on Money Laundering Law, 2000, SH No. 1753 (Isr.) (generally 
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suspicious activities and various civil and criminal penalties are 
available.
265
  Israel also criminalizes bribery.
266
 
The Saudi Arabian Combating Bribery Law was issued in 1992 by the 
Council of Ministries.
267
  The anti-bribery law outlaws bribes to public 
officials, private persons, and companies.  The law prevents paying money 
or using intimidation or force to obtain a benefit.
268
  Violators risk both 
monetary penalties and imprisonment while government officials are to be 
fired.
269
  The ill-gotten gains are to be impounded.
270
 
Qatar also has anti-corruption laws to combat financial crime.
271
  
These laws make illegal money laundering and fraud but also extend to 
commercial acts such as market manipulation.
272
  Impressively, Qatari anti-
corruption law also requires continuous examination of financial 
institutional transactions and makes illegal the failure to implement risk 
management systems and the opening or facilitating the opening of an 
anonymous account.
273
 
New Zealand is another example of a state with anti-money 
laundering and bribery laws.  Under New Zealand law, money laundering 
laws are also similar to the international standard with ‘know your 
customer’ requirements, mandatory reporting of suspicious activity, and 
civil and criminal penalties.
274
 
The above section detailed the specific and definite nature of the laws 
making financial criminal acts illegal.  The next section discusses that 
financial crime is the mutual interests of most if not virtually all nations. 
E. Financial Crime Touches the Mutual Interest of the Majority of 
 
defining “money laundering” under Israeli law). 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  See Penal Law 5737-1977, LSI (1978) Special Volume 291A (Isr.) (criminalizing 
bribery). 
 267.  Alharbi Ali Khalaf S., An Overview of the Saudi Arabian Criminal Justice 
Procedures Against Corruption in the Public Sector 124, 138th International Senior 
Seminar Participant’s Papers, 123, 124, available at 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No77/No77_14PA_Khalaf.pdf. 
 268.  Id. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Law of Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing 
 (Law No. 4 of 2010) (Qatar), available at 
http://www.almeezan.qa/LawArticles.aspx?LawTreeSectionID=9668&lawId=2610&langua
ge=en. 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. at art. 3. 
 274.  Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 (N.Z.), 
available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2009/0035/latest/096be8ed80a0260e.pdf.  
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Nations. 
 
Financial fraud, money laundering, and bribery impact the mutual 
interests of nations.  Out of national self-interest there is a global struggle 
against financial crime.  Thus, there is a global interest in preventing 
financial crimes.  International cooperation is growing through extensive 
international agreements.
275
  Financial crime is already being prosecuted 
with the collaboration of international governmental regulators.
276
  For 
example, the United States SEC has enforcement and regulatory 
cooperation with numerous countries, including Canada, Chile, Germany, 
Israel, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
277
  The SEC’s 
Office of International Affairs (“OIA”) cooperates with a “global network 
of securities regulators and law enforcement authorities to facilitate cross-
border regulatory compliance and ensure that international borders are not 
used to escape detection and prosecution of fraudulent securities 
activities.”
278
 
This concerted global effort to recover stolen wealth is a significant 
improvement from the past, when rogue leaders ransacked the national 
treasuries; there is now a concerted global effort to recover stolen wealth, 
“[w]hen other past dictators, such as Jean-Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier 
of Haiti, fled their countries, they often retired in comfort, living off their 
plundered assets in French villas and estates.  This time, the international 
community is working to ensure that such outrages are stories of the 
past.”
279
 
In SEC v. Juno Mother Earth Asset Management, the SEC claimed a 
 
 275.  OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 215; UN Convention against 
Illicit Traffic, supra note 218; UN Convention Against Corruption, supra note 212; U N 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 222. 
 276.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead 
Gulty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations And Agree to Pay $450 Million in 
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html (quoting Linda Chatman 
Thomsen, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement). (“Our success in bringing the 
company to justice is a testament to the close, coordinated working relationship among the 
SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice, and other U.S. and international law enforcement, 
particularly the Office of the Prosecutor General in Munich.”).  
 277.  See Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission Office of International Affairs, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_cooparrangements.shtml (listing countries that 
cooperate with SEC enforcement and regulation). 
 278.  Office of International Affairs, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia.shtml. 
 279.  Mark V. Vlasic, Getting Back the Bad Guy’s Loot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/opinion/getting-back-the-bad-guys-loot.html. 
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firm and its founders schemed to defraud investors and inflated assets, stole 
money and filed false reports.
280
  Cooperation with non-U.S. securities 
regulators was crucial in bringing the suit; the SEC acknowledged “the 
assistance of the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority and the Financial 
Market Authority Liechtenstein.”
281
 
In SEC v. Provident Capital Indemnity, the SEC filed (and the U.S. 
Justice Department filed a simultaneous criminal action) a complaint 
against a Costa Rican entity involved in a massive financial fraud.
282
  The 
SEC thanked the “Costa Rican Unidad de Analisis Financiero, the Ontario 
Securities Commission, the Gibraltar Financial Services Commission.”
283
 
Another example is SEC v. Imperia Invest IBC, wherein the SEC 
alleged the defendant defrauded 14,000 investors worldwide and pursued 
the case with “the assistance and cooperation of the State of Maine Office 
of Securities, the Securities Commission of the Bahamas, the Vanuatu 
Financial Services Commission and the Cyprus Securities and Exchange 
Commission.”
284
 
CONCLUSION 
Global financial crimes have real worldwide implications proximately 
causing lower economic growth, national impoverishment, empowerment 
of rogue leaders, civil war and terrorism.  Such conduct is a hallmark of 
failed states and the looting of national treasuries.  The vast majority of the 
nations of the world have concluded that it is in their self-interest to 
criminalize and sanction such conduct.  As such, certain fraudulent acts 
have developed into violations of norms of international law.  The ATS 
allows for suits based upon violations of well-established norms of 
international law.  Therefore, the ATS should provide for jurisdiction of 
such conduct. 
 
 
 
 
 280.  SEC Charges Hedge Fund Managers with Fraud, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N 
(Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21886.htm. 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  SEC Charges Offshore Company with Massive Life Settlement Bonding Fraud, 
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21818.htm. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  SEC Obtains Temporary Restraining Order and Asset Freeze of Imperia Invest IBC 
Relating to Internet Based Offering Fraud, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21686.htm. 
